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CHAPTER 2 
TrHsts and Estates 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI 
§2.I. Wills: Election. In Maney v. Maney1 a testator bequeathed 
$2500 to his brother, Louis. The will also provided that his "just 
debts . . . be paid" and that if "any legatee . . . shall contest the 
admission of this will to probate, then ... such legatee shall forfeit 
the legacy herein." Within a year of the appointment of testator's 
widow as executrix Louis was paid the $2500 legacy; he filed notices of 
a claim against the estate of $5 million for services rendered; and he 
brought an action on the claim by a writ with an ad damnum of $5 
million. The value of the estate was about $1.5 million. 
The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the lower court's dismissal of the 
exewtrix' bill in equity to enjoin the prosecution of the action and the 
claim by Louis. The executrix contended that the doctrine of elec-
tion was applicable; that the claim, if valid, would completely wipe 
out the estate of the decedent and necessarily thwart the working of the 
will; that Louis, by accepting the $2500 legacy, elected to receive the 
benefits of the legacy rather than pursue his claim. 
The Court concluded that the doctrine of election was inapplicable. 
Louis's claim for services was not inconsistent with his receipt of the 
legacy. The testator did not manifest an intent that the $2500 legacy 
be received in satisfaction of a claim or as anything other than an un-
conditional gift. Pointing out that the trial judge was not bound to 
find that the claim for services amounted to $5 million simply because 
that sum was set forth in the writ and the notices of claim, the Court 
treated "the assertions and admissions of an ad damnum of $5,000,000 
as relating only to a purely formal statement of a maximum claim 
and as not binding upon Louis . . . as establishing the true value of, 
and recovery upon, the claim, for purposes of this proceeding." 2 There 
was no proof that the claim would have exhausted the estate. 
It is established that if a person shall accept any beneficial interest 
under a will, he shall be held to confirm every part of the will and 
cannot set up a claim that will prevent the operation of any part of 
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§2.1. 1340 Mass. 350,164 N.E.2d 146 (1960). 
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the will.3 Noyes v. Noyes4 decided that a legatee who accepted bene-
ficial interests under a will should be enjoined from prosecuting a suit 
against the estate, the enforcement of which would prevent the opera-
tion of the will as to substantial provisions. On the other hand, Hol-
lister v. Old Colony Trust CO.5 and Turner v. White6 refused to apply 
the doctrine of election when the claims simply tended to diminish the 
shares of the residuary legatees and not to defeat the specific provisions 
of the will. 
It was argued that the enforcement of the claim in Maney would 
not merely diminish the estate but thwart the operation of any part 
of the will because recovery on the suit would exhaust the entire estate. 
But the Court quite properly concluded that the ad damnum in the 
writ and the amount set forth in the notices of claim did not furnish 
evidence that the legatee's successful prosecution of his claim would 
totally deplete the probate assets.7 
§2.2. Administrator: Fitness. The order of preference for appoint-
ment to administer intestate estates appears in a statutory provision.1 
The statutory language makes the question of the competency and 
suitability of a person petitioning for appointment as administrator 
as well as the propriety of his appointment largely discretionary with 
the Probate Court.2 Lack of suitability is not restricted to physical or 
mental incapacity but may also include "an unfitness arising out of the 
situation of the persons in connexion with the estate." 3 
In the case of Coles v. Goldie4 a petition by a husband of an intestate 
for his appointment as administrator was dismissed on the ground that 
3 Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou, 321 Mass. 615, 75 N.E.2d 3 (1947); Thurlow v. 
Thurlow, 317 Mass. 126, 56 N.E.2d 902 (1944); Noyes v. Noyes, 224 Mass. 125, 112 
N.E. 850 (1916); Watson v. Watson, 128 Mass. 152 (1880); Hyde v. Baldwin, 17 
Pick. 303 (Mass. 1835). See also 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.4. 
4233 Mass. 55, 123 N.E. 395 (1919); see also Noyes v. Noyes, 224 Mass. 125, 112 
N.E. 850 (1916). 
5328 Mass. 225,102 N.E.2d 770 (1952). 
6329 Mass. 549,109 N.E.2d 155 (1952); see also Riley v. Flanagan, 264 Mass. 13, 
161 N.E. 796 (1928). 
7 See C.L., c. 231, §87; Jennings v. Bragdon, 289 Mass. 595, 598. 194 N.E. 697, 698 
(1935); Clarke v. Taylor, 269 Mass. 335, 336·337, 168 N.E. 806, 807 (1929); Morton 
v. Clark, 181 Mass. 134,63 N.E. 409 (1902); Burman & Bolonsky, Inc. v. Luckenbach 
S.S. Co., 39 F.2d 619 (D. Mass. 1930). 
§2.2. 1 C.L., c. 193, §I, which provides in part: "Administration of the estate of 
a deceased intestate shall be granted to one or more of the persons hereinafter men· 
tioned and in the order named, if competent and suitable for the discharge of the 
trust and willing to undertake it, unless the court deems it proper to appoint some 
other person: 
"First, the widow, or surviving husband of the deceased. 
"Second, the next of kin or their guardians or conservators as the court shall de· 
termine .... " 
2 See Morgan v. Morgan, 267 Mass. 388, 392, 166 N.E. 747, 748 (1929); I Newhall, 
Settlement of Estates §47 (4th ed. 1958). 
3 Comstock v. Bowles, 295 Mass. 250, 260, 3 N.E.2d 817, 823 (1936); see also Quincy 
Trust Co. v. Taylor, 317 Mass. 195, 196, 57 N.E.2d 573, 574 (1944); Morgan v. Mor-
gan,267 Mass. 388, 392,166 N.E. 747,748 (1929). 
41960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 891, 167 N.E.2d 761. 
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he was not a suitable and competent person. He failed to disclose in-
formation that a woman listed in the petition as a sister of the decedent 
was really her illegitimate daughter. The dismissal of this petition 
and the appointment of the daughter was upheld as being within the 
proper discretion of the court. The case is somewhat similar to O'Sul-
livan v. Palmer/' in which an administrator's appointment was revoked 
because he did not list all the heirs known to him or give notice to those 
who were not listed. 
§2.3. Appointment of debtor as executor. Barnes v. Lee Savings 
Bank1 reaffirmed the principle of law that "when a debtor of an estate 
is appointed administrator or executor of his creditor, the debt is ex-
tinguished and is treated as paid. The debt becomes part of the assets 
of the estate and the administrator or executor must account .for the 
amount of such indebtedness." 2 The Supreme Judicial Court con-
cluded that a mortgage given by the debtor to the decedent was dis-
charged when the debtor, who was the sole beneficiary under the will, 
was appointed executor. The net result was to prefer a mortgagee 
junior to the testator. 
Although the rule is said to be based upon convenience and the in-
ability of a personal representative to bring suit against himself,s it 
should not be applied in such a way as to work an injustice.4 Ordinar-
ily, the discharge of a mortgage on property of the debtor to the ad-
vantage of other creditors would ostensibly be the type of situation that 
would be beyond the scope of the rule. In Barnes, however, the debtor 
was the sole legatee and it did not appear that the decedent had any 
creditors. 
§2.4. Appraisers: Compensation and expenses. It is customary for 
lawyers representing decedents' estates in probate proceedings to sug-
gest as appraisers of the inventory items those who have no special 
qualifications to make property appraisals. 1 Since the inventory's 
function is to provide a starting point for future probate accounting2 
and its stated values are not c~mclusive as to persons interested in the 
estate or as to state and federal tax collectors,S the activities of the 
5312 Mass. 240, 44 N.E.2d 958 (1942). 
§2.3. 1340 Mass. 87, 162 N.E.2d 666 (1959), also noted in §9.2 infra. 
2340 Mass. at 90,162 N.E.2d at 668. 
S Sullivan v. Sullivan, 335 Mass. 268, 271·272, 139 N .E.2d 510, 513·514 (1957), noted 
in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.3; Argus v. Kokkorou, 308 Mass. 315, 318, 32 
N.E.2d 211, 213 (1941); Bassett v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 184 Mass. 210, 212·213, 
68 N.E. 205,206 (1903). 
4 Kinney v. Ensign, 18 Pick. 232, 236 (Mass. 1836). 
§2.4. 1 It is also customary for the Probate Court to appoint the suggested ap· 
praisers. However, in Mulcahy v. Boynton, 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 879, 167 N.E.2d 
867, the register struck out one of the appraisers suggested and inserted the name 
of another, but this action was not the subject of controversy. 
2 See Hutchinson v. King, 339 Mass. 41, 45, 157 N.E.2d 525, 527·528 (1959), noted 
in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.6; 2 Newhall, Settlement of Estates §§274, 278, 279 
(4th ed. 1958). 
S Inheritance and estate tax valuation regulations may call for valuations by spe-
cialists if the property is other than cash or securities with a readily ascertainable 
3
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probate appraisers are often substantially clerical only. Expert or 
not, these appraisers are entitled to compensation for their services, 
the amount of which is subject to determination by the Probate 
Courts.4 
Mulcahy v. Boynton,5 decided during the 1960 SURVEY year, reduced 
the compensation that the Probate Court approved for one of three 
appraisers from $175 to $60 when the estate was appraised at approx-
imately $175,000. The ~upreme Judicial Court said: 
In the light of the routine duties and of the fact that the petitioner 
had, and needed, no specialized knowledge qualifying him to ap-
praise any unusual property, we think the rule of thumb proposed 
by [executor's counsel] of distributing one tenth of one per cent 
of the total value of the estate among the three appraisers was 
fair compensation. We, of course, do not suggest that an expert 
appraiser with specialized qualifications to appraise for taxation 
property of an unusual character would not be entitled in an ap-
propriate case to compensation for special work reflecting his 
training and expert knowledge.6 
The Court also held that it was error for the Probate Judge to 
allow $100 for the services and expenses of the appraiser's counsel. 
There was no justification for payment of counsel fees out of the estate 
when the services rendered afforded no benefit to the estate but sought 
to obtain an excessively large fee for the appraiser.7 
§2.5. Guardianship: Compensation of attorney. When a lawyer 
renders services material to the welfare of a ward and these services 
are contracted for by a guardian, the lawyer is entitled to an order for 
compensation from the estate of the ward to the extent of the reason-
able value of his services.1 In Hallett v. Oakes2 an attorney, who un-
successfully prosecuted a writ of habeas corpus to obtain the release 
of an insane person from an asylum before a guardian was appointed, 
was held entitled to recover a reasonable compensation for services 
regarded in the light of necessaries. 
An attorney whose efficiency and persistence brought about the re-
lease of a person committed as insane, despite the refusal of the 
market value. Estate attorneys, therefore, often make appraisals by those of special 
skills available to the probate appraisers or may seek to have experts appointed as 
such appraisers when tax valuations may be critical. 
4 C.L., c. 215, §39. 
51960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 879,167 N.E.2d 867. 
61960 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 884,167 N.E.2d at 871. 
7 See Miller v. Stern, 326 Mass. 296, 303-304, 93 N .E.2d 815, 819 (1950); I Newhall, 
Settlement of Estates §§32, 33 (4th ed. 1958); 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.4. 
§2.5. 1 See C.L., c. 215, §§39, 39A; id., c. 201, §37; Tomlinson v. Flanagan, 287 
Mass. 38, 44-45, 190 N.E. 785, 787 (1934); 2 Newhall, Settlement of Estates §392 (4th 
ed. 1958). 
21 Cush. 296 (Mass. 1848). 
4
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guardian and the Probate Court to permit the expenditure of guard-
ianship funds to pay for a psychiatric examination on the ground that 
such expenditure would be "fruitless," was held entitled to the reason-
able value of his services and expenses in the case of Hale v. Gravallese.3 
Since his efforts were requested by the ward and were substantially 
beneficial to the ward, he could not be placed in the role of an officious 
volunteer. 
In the Hale case the lawyer also sought added compensation for serv-
ices rendered on a second degree murder indictment against the ward. 
These services were apparently contracted for by the guardian and 
led to the acceptance of a plea of nolo contendere and the placing of 
the accused on probation for two years. The Court held that the at-
torney was entitled to the reasonable value of these services but re-
duced the amount sought.4 
The claims for services with regard to both the criminal matter and 
the release of the ward from confinement as an insane person could 
ordinarily be satisfied out of the estate in guardianship.1i However, 
in Hale the funds held by the guardian came into being from veteran 
pension payments from the federal government. Such payments are 
by statute exempt "from the claims of creditors, and shall not be 
liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable 
process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary." 6 
Since there was no evidence as to the nature and form of the corpus 
of the guardianship estate the Court directed that further . facts be 
reported. If the pension payments were invested in another form they 
would then lose their exempt status.7 
Subsequently, the judge of the Probate Court reported that it had 
been the custom of the guardian to cash the checks received as the 
pension payments, and, after paying bills of the ward, to deposit the 
balance in a savings bank in the name of the guardian. The guardian 
withdrew sums from this account to invest in United States Savings 
Bonds. The Court ruled that neither· the savings account nor the 
3340 Mass. 96,162 N.E.2d 817 (1959). 
4 Counsel sought $5000 and the Court allowed $3000. Some 34 years elapsed be-
tween the date of indictment and the acceptance of the plea of nolo contendere. 
The Court stated: "[The attorney] entered his appearance for the defendant and 
prepared the case for trial. He arranged with the district attorney for a favorable 
disposal of the indictment and within a short time brought the prosecution to an 
end. We are not disposed to minimize the value of these services, but experience 
leads us to doubt whether in the circumstances great difficulty was encountered in 
prevailing upon the district attorney to conclude the prosecution. It does not ap· 
pear whether in fact the murder could then have been proved. Having in mind that 
the maximum compensation allowed an attorney who is assigned to defend a first 
degree murder case is $1000 [Rule 95 of the Superior Court (1954)] and considering 
the financial condition of the ward, [the guardian held funds approximately in the 
amount of $20,000] we think that the award for defending against the indictment 
for second degree murder should be not more than $3,000." 340 Mass. at 101, 162 
N .E.2d at 820·821. 
5 See authorities cited in note 1 supra. 
67I Stat. 121, 38 U.S.C. §3101 (1958), formerly 38 U.S.C. §454a (1952). 
7 Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U.S. 545, 59 Sup. Ct. 707, 83 L. Ed. 976 (1939). 
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bonds were exempt from being applied by the guardian in satisfaction 
of the attorney's claim.s 
§2.6. Short statute of limitations: Recovery of taxes. General 
Laws, c. 197, §9,1 the short statute of limitations, by its terms bars only 
claims of creditors of the deceased. It has been held inapplicable to 
an action to recover a tax assessed againt an executrix upon the per-
sonal estate of her testatrix.2 But, when a tax is assessed to a decedent, 
its collection may be barred by the short statute of limitations.s 
Town of Milford v. Casamassa4 decided that real estate taxes re-
lieved under the exemption provided by G.L., c. 59, §511 could be re-
covered by a town in an action of contract brought under G.L., c. 59, 
§5A,6 more than one year after the appointment of an administratrix 
of the estate of the deceased real estate owner. The Court concluded 
that the provision of the final sentence of Section 5A that the "collector 
shall present the claim for payment in the same manner as provided 
for presentation of claims of creditors of the estate and have like 
power to bring suit thereon" did not remit the tax collector to the 
remedies available to the creditor who became such during the dece-
dent's life. The purpose of the provision was to give him the remedies 
ordinarily given to one who acquired a claim against the estate aris-
ing after the decedent's death. 
The Court reasoned that: 
Section 5A requires payment of the amount of the taxes of which 
the decedent was "relieved" only if the estate exceeds, among other 
items, the decedent's "debts." The first sentence of §5A thus in 
SHale v. Gravallese, 340 Mass. 722, 166 N.E.2d 557 (1960). 
§2.6. 1 The section provides in part: ". . . an . . . administrator shall not be 
held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which is not commenced 
within one year from the time of his giving bond ... " 
2 Dallinger v. Davis, 149 Mass. 62, 20 N.E. 696 (1889). 
SBartlett v. Tufts, 241 Mass. 96, 134 N.E. 630 (1922); Rich v. Tuckerman, 121 
Mass. 222 (1876). 
4339 Mass. 702, 162 N.E.2d 284 (1959). 
II Clause Eighteenth exempts from local taxation: "Subject to section five A, the 
polls and any portion of the estates of persons who by reason of age, infirmity and 
poverty are in the judgement of the assessors unable to contribute fully toward the 
public charges." 
6 Section 5A reads as follows: "In the event that a person is relieved of taxation 
under any provision of clause Seventeenth or of clause Eighteenth of section five, 
upon his death his estate, to the extent that it exceeds his debts, reasonable funeral 
and burial expenses and reasonable expenses of administration, shall be chargeable 
with the amount of taxes from which he is so relieved with interest at the rate of 
six per cent per annum from the date of his death. His estate shall be so chargeable 
notwithstanding the time when such taxes were assessed; provided however, that 
they were assessed on or after January first, nineteen hundred and forty·two. The 
assessors shall annually compute the amount of such taxes, record the same and, 
upon the death of the person relieved, commit the aggregate amount to the collector 
upon a special warrant, and such collector shall present the claim for payment in 
the same manner as provided for presentation of claims of creditors of the estate 
and have like power to bring suit thereon." 
6
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by a successor trustee. The only person who has a present vested in-
terest in the trust property is not disqualified from so assenting. The 
Court ruled that there was no basis for finding that the bank was 
unsuitable to act as single trustee or that it could not deal fairly with 
all beneficiaries. 
§2.9. Trust accounting: Guardian ad litem. In 1958, the case of 
In re Claflin1 decided that a testamentary trustee represented all of the 
beneficiaries of the trust and that a guardian ad litem should not have 
been appointed in a proceeding involving the allowance of the execu-
tors' accounts. The Court then stated: "The trustee's duty to account 
is the feature which is of the greatest practical importance here. 
When the time comes for the allowance of a trustee's account, minors 
and unborn and unascertained persons who are or may become bene-
ficiaries under the trust will have the protection of a guardian ad 
litem." 2 
Following the decision of Claflin, the executors' final account, which 
showed a complete distribution of the estate, was allowed without any 
notice given to the beneficiaries of the trust. Four accounts were later 
filed by the trustee and a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent 
minor beneficiaries and persons unborn and unascertained in the mat-
ter of their allowance. A request by the guardian ad litem to inspect 
income, estate, and inheritance tax returns of the estate and vouchers 
in support of their accounts was declined by the executors on the 
grounds that the accounts had been finally adjudicated and that the 
duty of the guardian ad litem did not require or authorize him to con-
sider these documents. The trustee notified the guardian ad litem 
that it was kept informed of all major administration items and that 
it had examined the accounts and vouchers of the executors to a suffi-
cient extent to determine that the items were proper and that the 
share distributed to the trust was accurately ascertained. 
The guardian ad litem objected to the allowance of the accounts, 
stating that without the vouchers and tax returns he could not de-
termine whether the trustee was negligent in permitting the allowance 
of the executor's accounts without objection; that a perusal of these 
documents was required for the adequate representation of the in-
terests of minors and unborn and unascertained persons. 
In Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Linsley} the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court indicated that if an investigation of the executors' vouchers 
and tax returns was sought to show nothing but negligence, it would 
not be justified.4 It was recognized that not only the trustee's adminis-
§2.9. 1336 Mass. 578, 146 N.E.2d 914 (1958), noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §2.2. 
2336 Mass. at 584,146 N.E.2d at 917. 
s 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 811,167 N.E.2d 624. 
4 The word "indicated" is used advisedly. The guardian ad litem subpoenaed the 
executors to produce t):J.e vouchers and tax returns. The trustee and the executors 
filed a petition to quash the subpoenas and the Probate Court reserved and reported 
the petition to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the report because of lack of jurisdiction 
on the part of the Probate Court to reserve and report such a case. G.L., c. 215, §13, 
7
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tration of the trust but also the trustee's duty to acquire from the 
executors all the property to which the trust was entitled was involved 
in the allowance of the trustee's account. The Court, however, re-
marked: 
Once it should appear to him that there has been reasonable in-
vestigation by the trustee, a heavy burden will descend upon him 
to justify further expenditure of his time. Nevertheless the cir-
cumstances do not operate as a rule of law to interpose a complete 
bar to a reasonable performance of a part of his duties. 
Where there have been previous decrees on the executors' ac-
counts, the amount of time which may be needfully spent by the 
guardian ad litem is a subject for close scrutiny. This observa-
tion is most pertinent here where the will contains an exculpatory 
clause which provides: "No executor ... or trustee shall be 
liable for any error in judgement or for anything except his 
... or its own individual wilful misconduct." The guardian ad 
litem in his report states that his object is "to determine whether 
the trustee of the testamentary trust was negligent." Proof of neg-
ligence would not be proof of wilful misconduct.1I 
If the guardian ad litem were allowed to make the investigation he 
sought to make without any suspicion of a basis for surcharge, it would 
tend to subvert the policy behind the statute that makes a final decree 
entered on a probate account unimpeachable except for fraud or mani-
fest error.6 After allowance of the accounts of the trustee involved 
in the Linsley case, it would appear that a substantial degree of finality 
should attach to the decree and subsequent guardians ad litem ap-
pointed in subsequent accountings by the same trustee ought not re-
view the performance of the first guardian ad litem in the absence of 
suspicion of neglect of duties, fraud, or manifest error. It should make 
no difference that the final account of the executors was allowed with-
out a guardian ad litem haying been appointed because the Claflin 
case had already decided that the trustee properly represented the 
beneficiaries and no guardian should have been appointed. 
One cannot help but commiserate with the guardian ad litem in 
Linsley because he appeared to seek to do that which the Court in the 
Claflin case implied would be required of him.7 
limits the power to reserve and report to cases in two classes: cases in which inter-
locutory decrees or orders had been made and cases that had been heard for final 
determination. This case came within neither class. 
111960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 811, 814-815, 167 N.E.2d 624, 626·627. 
6 G.L., c. 206, §24 .. 
7 "For allowance of the executors' account reliance can safely be placed upon the 
responsibility of the trustee. No need here appears for the appOintment of a guard-
ian ad litem to duplicate the work of the trustee, a fiduciary of at least equal dignity 
having itself an obligation to account. The trustee's duty to account is the feature 
which is of the greatest practical importance here. When the time comes for the 
allowance of a trustee's account, minors and unborn and unascertained persons who 
are or may become beneficiaries under the trust will have the protection of a guard-
ian ad litem." (EmDhasis added.) ~6 Mass. 578, 584,146 N.E.2d 914, 917 (1958). 
8
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§2.10. Apportionment of trust income. When property is settled 
in trust to pay the income to a person for life and on his death to pay 
the principal to another, the income that has been received by the trus-
tee or that has accrued before the life beneficiary dies and has not been 
paid to him must be paid to his personal representatives unless the 
trust provides otherwise.1 National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. 
Morey,2 referring to the Massachusetts apportionment statute, G.L., c. 
197, §27, said: 
Doubtless it was thought to be more just and probably also in 
most instances more nearly consistent with the real desires of the 
testator or the person creating the right that the beneficiary should 
have the income up to the moment of termination of his estate 
rather than that he should be deprived of income upon which he 
may have been relying for a period while the estate was still his, 
which might be long, if termination should occur immediately be-
fore a payment date. In order to avoid the statute an intent to 
provide "otherwise" should appear with substantial clarity. It is 
not enough merely to say that without any statute the will or in-
strument would not be construed as providing for apportionment.3 
The question of whether a will expressed a testator's intent to avoid 
apportionment of accrued and accumulated income arose in the case 
of Loring v. Cotter.4 The fifth clause of the will bequeathed a sum 
of money to trustees to pay the income to the testator's wife for life 
"and on her death, [to] pay over the principal fund with any accumu-
lations of income and additions thereto to [a school]." The will cre-
ated two other trusts for the wife of the testator with gifts over on her 
death. These two trusts did not contain any language to the effect 
that income accumulations and additions were to pass to the corpus 
beneficiaries when the life estates terminated. The Supreme Judicial 
Court decided that with respect to the trust created by the fifth clause 
the trustees were to pay over to the school (1) accumulated net in-
com<; in their possession, (2) interest accrued on bonds to the date of 
death of the life beneficiary and received by the trustees after that 
date, and (3) dividends declared to stock of record prior to the date of 
death of the life beneficiary but paid after that date. 
Admitting that the question is not free from difficulty, the Court 
thought that the entire will evinced an intent to depart from the ordi-
nary rule of apportionment: Relying upon the canon of construction 
that every word of a will be given a meaning if possible, the argument 
that the phrase "and on her death, pay over the principal fund with 
§2.10. 1 1 Restatement of Trusts Second §235A; 3 Scott, Trusts§235A (2d ed. 
1956). General Laws, c. 197, §27, provides: "A person entitled to an annuity, rent, 
interest or income, or his representative, shall have the same apportioned if his right 
or estate therein terminates between the days upon which it is payable, unless other-
wise provided in the will or instrument by which it was created." 
2301 Mass. 37, 16 N.E.2d 2 (1938). 
3301 Mass. at 39, 16 N.E.2d at 3. 
4339 Mass. 689, 162 N.E.2d 294 (1959). 
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any accumulations of income and additions thereto" referred to the 
period between the death of the life beneficiary and ultimate distri-
bution was rejected. Such an interpretation would have made the 
phrase superfluous, since the rule of apportionment would cause any 
income accruing or accumulating after the death of the income bene-
ficiary to go to the corpus beneficiary. 
There are several cases in other states deciding that accrued and 
accumulated income should go to the personal representative of the 
income beneficiary when the language of trusts was similar to that 
contained in the fifth clause of the will in the Loring case.1> Much 
can be said for this approach. The income is given to the life bene-
ficiary and becomes her absolute property. The trustees cannot refuse 
to pay it to her and decide to accumulate it and convert it into corpus. 
The testator did not give the trustees the discretion to withhold income 
from the income beneficiary and to give it to the remainderman: he 
gave the income to his wife absolutely.6 
In Loring, however, the construction of the phrase in the fifth 
clause of the will appears to be defensible in view of the omission of 
similar language introducing the gifts of the principal in the other two 
trusts created by the same instrument. 
In Thorndike v. Dexter,7 also decided during the 1960 SURVEY year, 
a will left the residue of the estate in trust with a direction for the 
payment of the income "quarterly, or oftener if convenient, to my 
daughters living at the time of such payment." There were alterna-
tive contingent gifts over on the death of one or both daughters. 
The testator died on August 26, 1956, at which time a tort action 
was pending against him and a new action was brought against his 
executors after his death. The amount claimed in each action ex-
ceeded the value of the estate and two notices of claim were filed in the 
Probate Court. In July, 1957, the time for filing claims against the 
estate was extended, and in September, 1957, a petition was filed for 
a decree ordering the executors to retain all of the assets of the estate 
in their hands. In April, 1958, the two tort actions terminated favor-
ably for the estate, and the petition to retain assets was dismissed. 
One of the testator's two daughters died on May 31, 1958. The 
executors at that time held a substantial amount of income including 
interest accrued on bonds, interest on a capital interest in a firm, and 
dividends on stock, unpaid but declared. The Probate Court decreed 
that the deceased daughter's personal representatives were entitled 
to one-half of the net income that had accrued to the testator's execu-
tors before May 31, 1958. On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court 
modified this decree by directing that one-half of the net income avail-
able for distribution before May 26, 1958, be paid to the executors of 
the deceased daughter. 
5 See 3 Scott, Trusts §235A (2d ed. 1956), and cases cited in note 10. 
6See Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Spiegelberg, II7 N.J. Eq. 171, 175 
Atl. 164 (1934). 
7340 Mass. 387, 164 N.E.2d 338 (1960). 
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After having observed that the testator avoided the application of 
G.L., c. 197, §27, by providing for payments to "daughters living at 
the time of such payment," the Court stated: "We do not, however, 
find an intent that, whatever the cause and length of the delay, the 
income shall be paid only to the beneficiaries living at the time when 
payment is made." 8 An unforeseen delay prevented the quarterly 
payments from being made for a substantial period of time. Were it 
not for these extraordinary circumstances, the deceased daughter would 
have received one-half of all the income available for distribution on 
or before May 26, 1958. May 26 was substituted for the May 31 date 
set out in the decree of the lower court in order to have the quarters 
measured from August 26, 1956, the date of the testator's death.9 
The Court directed that the net funds in the hands of the executors 
payable as income on May 26, 1958, were to be deemed funds then 
payable as though held by the trustees, and cash received after May 26 
on items then accrued and payable that were equivalent to cash on 
hand, such as overdue coupons on bearer bonds, was to be accounted 
for as though on hand on that date. 
In Thorndike v. Dexter it seems clear that the testator intended to 
limit the income beneficiaries to only the daughters or daughter alive 
at the time the payments were actually made, and in this aspect the case 
is somewhat similar to Dolbeare v. Kirby.10 The latter case considered 
the mode of distribution of a residuary estate that was given "in equal 
shares to [certain named persons] or to those of them as shall be living 
at the time the property is divided." Concluding that the estate of one 
of the named persons who died before actual distribution was not en-
titled to take, the observation was made: "A testatrix might wish to 
make a gift to designated beneficiaries only in case they could receive 
it personally. In this case apt words were used to express such an in-
tent." 11 
Dolbeare further resembles Thorndike in that the distribution of the 
estate was delayed for more than four years after testatrix' death be-
cause of litigation. But the Thorndike case involved a trust that re-
quired that the income be paid at least quarteily to designated bene-
ficiaries while they were alive and the deprivation of these beneficiaries 
of income for several quarters after the donor's death would appear to 
conflict with his intended dispositive scheme. In the Dolbeare case the 
testatrix expressed her desire to benefit only those living at the date of 
distribution of the residue. 
§2.11. Relinquishment of trustee's power. An attempted relin-
quishment of a power by a co-trustee was declared to be of no legal 
effect in the case of Sherry v. Little.1 There, the testator created two 
trusts in which he gave his widow substantial beneficial interests with 
8340 Mass. at 389, 164 N.E.2d at 340. 
9 See Minot v. Amory, 2 Cush. 377 (Mass. 1848). 
10265 Mass. 259, 163 N.E. 899 (1928). 
11265 Mass. at 261, 163 N .E. at 899. 
§2.II. 11960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 935, 167 N.E.2d 872. 
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remainders over to his daughters and their issue. He named his widow 
and a Mary E. Little co-executrices and co-trustees. The two fiduci-
aries were granted the usual powers and certain special powers one of 
which read: "If co-executors or co-trustees disagree while my wife is 
an executor or trustee then her decision shall control except as to 
powers expressly delegated to others than herself." The major portion 
of the estate consisted of stock in closely held corporations. 
The widow and Mary Little executed a written agreement that re-
cited that Mary deemed that the possible exercise of the controlling 
power by the widow might result in decisions contrary to Mary's un-
derstanding as to her duties as a fiduciary and contrary to the best 
interests of the estate and the trusts, that Mary contemplated resign-
ing, that the widow believed that the trust would be more efficiently 
administered if both fiduciaries had equal powers, that the widow re-
leased her power to have the controlling decision in case of disagree-
ment, and that Mary agreed to continue to serve as a co-fiduciary. 
The Court found the agreement to be invalid because it sought to 
abrogate a power that was an intregal part of the testator's estate 
plan. Since both executrices accepted the trust they were bound to 
administer it according to the express terms of the testator's will. 
There are limited circumstances in which a trustee may deviate 
from a term of the trust in case of an emergency.2 The Sherry case, 
however, presented no evidence of impending necessity or of material 
changes in circumstances not anticipated by the testator. The con-
trolling power of decision given the widow was an administrative 
power and as such appears to be beyond the purview of G.L., c. 204, §27, 
permitting the complete or partial release of a power of appointment.3 
§2.12. Charitable trusts: Cy pres. Benjamin Franklin died in 1790 
testate leaving 1000 pounds sterling in trust to the inhabitants of Bos-
ton.1 The trustees were to let out the fund upon interest to young 
2 See 1 Restatement of Trusts Second §167(2). Comment e provides: "If owing 
to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him, to comply 
with the terms of the trust would defeat or substantially impair the purposes of 
the trust, and the trustee deviates from the terms of the trust without having first 
obtained the permission or direction of the court to do so, the trustee is not liable 
to the beneficiary if the court subsequently approves such deviation. 
"If the trustee deviates from the terms of the trust without first obtaining the 
permission or direction of the court, he does so at his own risk; when the propriety of 
the deviation is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved by the court and not by the 
trustee." 
See also Winthrop v. Attorney General, 128 Mass. 258, 261 (1880). 
8 G.L., c. 204, §27, provides in part: "A power of appointment, whether or not 
coupled with an interest, ... and whether the power is held by the donee in an 
individual or in a fiduciary capacity, may be released, wholly or partially, by the 
donee thereof, unless otherwise expressly provided in the instrument creating the 
power .... [T]he term power of appointment includes all powers which are in sub-
stance and effect powers of appointment regardless of the language used in creating 
them and whether they are: (a) general, special, or otherwise; (b) in gross, appendant, 
simply collateral, in trust, or otherwise .... " 
§2.l2. 1 For the history of this bequest see Higginson v. Turner, 171 Mass. 586,51 
N.E. 172 (1898); City of Boston v. Doyle, 184 Mass. 373, 68 N.E. 851 (1903); City of 
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apprentices and the hope was expressed that no part of the fund re-
main uninvested or diverted to other purposes. At the end of one 
hundred years the trustees were to expend a sum of money for public 
works and the remainder of the fund "I would have continued to be 
let out at interest in the manner above directed for another hundred 
years ... " At the end of two hundred years the fund was to be di-
vided in specified shares between Boston and Massachusetts. 
No loans had been made to apprentices since 1886 and the trust 
fund had been fully invested in other ways since that time. In 1894, 
an amount of money required to be laid out at the end of the first 
hundred years was paid to the city of Boston. This money, together 
with an equal sum given by Andrew Carnegie, was used in the establish-
ment and equipment of the Franklin Technical Institute, a technical 
school operated by the Franklin Foundation. 
In 1958, the legislature enacted a statute2 providing that both Bos-
ton and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts were authorized to pay 
their share of the funds for the use of the Franklin Technical Institute 
if the Supreme Judicial Court should authorize such payment and 
termination. With the market value of the fund about $1.5 million 
in February, 1959, the Franklin Foundation brought a bill in equity 
to "implement" the 1958 statute. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in Franklin Foundation v. Attorney 
General,!l saw no good reason to exercise its authority in equity to ter-
minate the trust. It recognized that the need for expanding technical 
institute education was imperative in these times and that it was im-
possible to employ the fund in loans to young apprentices. However, 
it pointed out that Franklin had another major purpose - to make a 
gift to Boston and the state at the two hundredth anniversary of the 
fund. The termination of the trust could not be compelled since a 
continuation of the trust was necessary to carry out a material pur-
pose. 
In Anna Jaques Hospital v. Attorney Genera14 the doctrine of cy 
pres was applied when the specific desires of a donor to a charity 
could not be fulfilled. There a testator left the residue of his estate to 
a certain hospital in trust to be used for the purchase of medicines, 
instruments, and equipment for the hospital. When it became im-
practicable for the hospital to continue its operations, its assets, in-
cluding the trust fund, were transferred to another hospital in the 
same city. The Court emphasized the fact that there was no provision 
for a gift over on the failure of the trust and expressed its approval of 
the modern tendency to find a general charitable purpose when particu-
lar stated purposes become impracticable or impossible. II 
Boston v. Curley, 276 Mass. 549, 177 N.E. 557 (1931); Franklin Foundation v. City of 
Boston, 336 Mass. 39, 142 N.E.2d 367 (1957). 
2 Acts of 1958, c. 596. 
3340 Mass. 197,163 N.E.2d 662 (1960). 
41960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 887, 167 N.E.2d 875. 
Ii See 4 Scott, Trusts §399 (2d ed. 1956); see also 2 Restatement of Trusts Second 
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§2.13. Power of appointment: Succession tax. When a power of 
appointment is exercised the donor is considered to be the source of 
the appointee's interest in the property subject to the power. The 
donee is the conduit through whom the property devolves and, in 
effect, he acts as agent of the donor in selecting the transferee and the 
terms of the transfer. Unless a succession tax statute provides other-
wise, the impact of such an excise tax is on the receipt of the bene-
ficial interest by the appointee from the donor.1 Under the Massa-
chusetts statute the tax due is based upon the relationship of the ap-
pointee to the decedent donor and the value of the property at the 
time the appointee becomes entitled to enjoy or possess the property.2 
In Curtis v. Commissioner of Corporations and TaxationS the donee 
of a general testamentary power of appointment exercised the power 
by appointing the principal of a trust fund to the "executor of [her] 
will ... to be ... dealt with ... as general assets of my estate." 
Her will then left the residue of her estate to a trustee in trust to pay 
the income to her sister for life with remainders over. The Commis-
sioner of Corporations and Taxation certified as the tax due from the 
trust under the donor's will a sum based on the value of all of the 
appointed property as of the date of the donee's death computed at 
the statutory rate designated for the donee's relationship to the donor. 
The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the commissioner, con-
cluding that those who receive appointive property take from the 
donor and not from the donee and that the disposition was a succession 
taxable only in the donor's estate. It was not considered significant 
that the donee disposed of the property by two steps - appointment 
to her estate followed by a residuary bequest - instead of by one step 
through the residuary clause. The Court thought that the commis-
sioner's stand would emphasize form over substance. 
In another instance the mode of exercise of a power of appointment 
has had far-reaching legal consequences. Under the doctrine of "cap-
ture," the "blending" of the donee's individually owned assets with the 
subject matter of the power has resulted in the distribution of the 
appointive assets among the donee's next-of-kin when the attempted 
appointment failed. 4 However, an appointment to the donee's estate 
§399, Comment i, which provides in part: "The court can fairly infer an expectation 
on the part of the settlor that in course of time circumstances might so change that 
the particular purpose could no longer be carried out, and that in such a case the 
settlor would prefer a modification of his scheme rather than that the charitable 
trust should fail and the property be distributed among his heirs who might be 
very numerous and only remotely related to him." 
§2.l3. 13 Restatement of Property §333; 5 American Law of Property §23.24 
(Casner ed. 1952); Emmons v. Shaw, 171 Mass. 410, 50 N.E. 1033 (1898). 
2 G.L., c. 65, §§l, 13. 
S 340 Mass. 169, 163 N.E.2d 151 (1959). 
4 Amerige v. Attorney General, 324 Mass. 648, 660·663, 88 N.E.2d 126, 133·135 
(1949); Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou, 321 Mass. 615, 622·627, 75 N.E.2d 3, 8·11 
(1947). 
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and a residuary gift out would not validate gifts under the rule against 
perpetuities when a one-step appointment would be invalid.5 
If the commissioner had prevailed in the Curtis case the way would 
have been opened for a second tax being imposed on the devolution 
of the same property to the appointees. Without intimating as to the 
constitutional validity of such a double excise, the Court felt that a 
clear legislative mandate should be present before such adverse tax 
consequences attach to "form" rather than "substance." 
§2.14. Scope of power to consume principal. The scope of a power 
to invade principal for the benefit of a life beneficiary was considered 
in two cases decided in 1960. The first, Pittsfield National Bank v. 
United States,! decided by the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, turned to local law2 to determine whether 
a power to consume principal was a general power of appointment 
for estate tax purposes.3 A trust beneficiary, who was entitled to in-
come for life "together with all or such part of the principal of the 
same as he may from time to time request, he to be the sole judge of 
his needs," was held to have a power limited by an ascertainable stand-
ard. 
Under Massachusetts law a "power to sell, mortgage, or otherwise 
dispose of so much of my estate as in [the life beneficiary's] judgement 
shall be necessary for her comfortable support and maintenance with-
out securing a license therefor from the Probate Court" has been held 
to be a limited power.4 When the residue of an estate was left to 
trustees in trust to pay the income to the testator's wife for life "for 
the support and maintenance of herself, and the care, maintenance 
and education of our children" it was decided that the income received 
by the wife was subject to reasonable support of herself and the chil-
dren and that which was not needed for such reasonable support was 
held by her as her own property free of the trust.5 An income bene-
ficiary's power to dispose of principal, "whenever in his judgement he 
may deem it conducive to his comfort to do so" has been held to be a 
5 Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou, 321 Mass. 615, 75 N.E.2d 3 (1947); compare 
Union and New Haven Trust Co. v. Taylor, 133 Conn. 221, 50 A.2d 168 (1948). 
§2.14. 1181 F. Supp. 851 (D. Mass. 1960). 
2 "Neither the statute nor the Regulations create a new federal standard, and the 
charitable deduction cases also have had to turn to local law for determinations of 
the measurability of powers of invasion of principle." Id. at 853. See Blodget v. 
Delaney, 201 F.2d 589 (1st. Cir. 1953); Gammons v. Hassett, 121 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 
1941). 
326 U.S.C. §2041(b)(I) (1958) defines a general power of appointment as "a power 
which is exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors 
of his estate; except that - (A) A power to consume, invade, or appropriate property 
for the benefit of the decedent which is limited by an ascertainable standard re-
lating to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the decedent shall not 
be deemed a general power of appointment." 
4 Nunes v. Rogers, 307 Mass. 438,30 N.E.2d 259 (1940). 
5 Johnson v. Johnson, 215 Mass. 276, 102 N.E. 465 (1913). 
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power limited by the standard of physical comfort and support.6 
Blodget v. Delaney7 concluded that a power to invade corpus for "the 
comfort and welfare" of a beneficiary authorized expenditures for his 
physical comfort and the assurance of the perpetuation of his estab-
lished way of life. 
On the other hand, in Gammons v. Hassett8 a life beneficiary's power 
to invade corpus to the extent that she "may at any time and from time 
to time need or desire" was considered to be without any objective 
limits and rendered the value of charitable remainders unascertainable 
at the testator's death and thus prevented a charitable deduction from 
the gross estate. The word "desire" was the offending word. 
The Pittsfield National Bank case seized upon the word "needs" in 
reaching its decision that the power was limited by an ascertainable 
standard. The court thought that "actual financial or physical neces-
sity" must be shown before the power could be exercised.9 If the 
power could have been exercised only for the satisfaction of the "needs" 
of a beneficiary, it is difficult to see how a controversy could arise. 
But, in Pittsfield National Bank) the will creating the power to invade 
provided that the income beneficiary was to be sole judge of his needs. 
The court did not specifically allude to these words that by themselves 
appear to make the discretion given the donee subject only to his 
subjective determinations, but it thought that the word "needs" would 
be without any significance if it did not limit the exercise of the 
power.10 
The other case decided in Massachusetts involving the scope of the 
power to consume principal was Maher v. Kezer. l1 A testator left the 
residue of his estate in trust "[t]o allow Agnes S. Kezer, who has so 
well and faithfully cared for me and my home for many years, to have 
the free use and income of my homestead . . . and the income of all 
my remaining personal property during her lifetime." The trustees 
were authorized to use the principal "of said personal property" for 
Agnes' comfortable support and maintenance and the keeping of the 
homestead in good repair. The trustees were also given the power to 
6 Homans v. Foster, 232 Mass. 4, 121 N.E. 417 (1919); Stocker v. Foster, 178 Mass. 
591,60 N.E. 407 (1901). 
7201 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1953). 
8121 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1941). 
9 See Lincoln v. Willard, 296 Mass. 549, 6 N.E.2d 774 (1937). 
10 Compare Merchants National Bank of Boston v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, 320 U.S. 256, 64 Sup. Ct. 108, 88 L. Ed. 35 (1947), in which an admonition that 
a trustee "exercise its discretion with liberality" in invading corpus for the benefit 
of an income beneficiary was emphasized by the Court in reaching a decision that 
an estate tax charitable deduction was lost because the charitable remainder was 
not "presently ascertainable." However, in that case the trustee could invade corpus 
"at such time or times as my said Trustee shall in its sole discretion deem wise and 
proper for the comfort, support, maintenance, and/or happiness of my said 
wife ... " (Emphasis supplied.) See 1 Restatement of Trusts Second §187, Com-
mentj. 
11 340 Mass. 263, 163 N.E.2d 298 (1960). 
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sell both the real and personal estate and were directed to hold the 
proceeds as part of the trust to be expended "under the same rules and 
conditions as apply to the rest of the trust fund." Upon the death of 
Agnes the fund was to be paid to a hospital. The trustees sold the 
homestead and sought instructions as to whether they could invade 
the principal derived from the sale of real estate for the comfortable 
support and maintenance of Agnes. 
The Court decided that the proceeds from the sale of the homestead 
could be used for the support and maintenance of Agnes. It was ob-
served that it was apparent that she was the primary object of testator's 
bounty. The phrase in the will stating that the proceeds derived 
from the sale of the realty "shall become and be held as part of this 
trust and expended under the same rules and conditions as apply to 
the rest of the trust fund," when construed with the rest of the will, 
manifested an intent that these proceeds be treated in the same manner 
as the personal property. 
The doctrine of equitable conversion could not be applied because 
the will did not direct the trustees to convert the real estate into per-
sonalty; it merely authorized such conversion.12 Under the general 
rule a sale of land by a trustee under a power of sale impresses upon 
the proceeds the character of real estate in so far as the dispositive 
rights of beneficiaries are concerned.13 The Court, however, departed 
from the ordinary rule because it was not consonant with the testator's 
expressed wishes. 
§2.15. Remainders: Preference for early vesting. The general pol-
icy favoring a construction of a remainder as vested instead of con-
tingent was employed to resolve an ambiguous limitation in Old Col-
ony Trust Co. v. Tufts.1 A testator disposed of a major portion of 
his residuary estate in varying amounts to ten named individuals. The 
bequests to nine of them provided in each instance that in case the 
legatee "shall predecease me" his share was to go to "his issue . . . by 
right of representation." The gift to the tenth, who had no issue, 
was to lapse "in case that she shall predecease me." Another part of 
the residue was left in trust under which the trustee was to pay the 
income to two beneficiaries, "and upon the decease of said survivor, 
then to pay the principal of the trust to those then entitled to re-
ceive the other shares of the . . . residue . . . of my . . . estate un-
der the terms of this will, paying to each a share proportionate to' the 
share he or she is entitled to of said . . . residue . . . under the terms 
of this will." 
12 Gray v. Whittemore, 192 Mass. 367, 384, 78 N.E. 422, 429 (1906); compare 
Baker v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 253 Mass. 130, 148 N.E. 593 
(1925). 
13 See Whitman v. Huefner, 221 Mass. 265, 108 N.E. 1054 (1915); Gray v. Whitte-
more, 192 Mass. 367, 78 N.E. 422 (1906); Holland v. Cruft, 3 Gray 162, 180-181 
(Mass. 1855). 
§2.15. 11960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 991. 168 N.E.2d 86. 
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All of the individual residuary legatees survived the testator. At 
the date of termination of the trust three of the residuary legatees were 
living; and the others had died, six of them leaving issue. 
A majority of the Supreme Judicial Court held that the trust fund 
was to be paid proportionately to the three surviving residuary legatees 
and the estates of the seven deceased legatees. The Court relied upon 
the preference for early vesting of future interests when it perceived 
no manifestation of a contrary intent; and it noted that because of the 
adopted construction no implication of words became necessary. 
The word "then" appearing in the limitation disposing of the prin-
cipal caused difficulty. "Then" introducing a gift over after a life 
estate mayor may not make the remainder contingent, depending 
upon context. A direction that a trustee pay "income to B for life 
and then pay the principal to C" does not create a contingent re-
mainder in C. The word "then" appears to be either a conjunctive 
or an indication of the time of distribution of principal rather than 
a manifestation of an intent to postpone the vesting of C's interest.2 
On the other hand, a gift to B for life and upon B's death remainder 
"to the children of B then living" gives B's children a contingent inter-
est only; "then" refers to the point of time that the children have to 
survive in order to take.s 
In Tufts the word "then" appears twice in the sentence providing 
for the gift of the principal of the trust - "then to pay the principal 
of the trust to those then entitled to receive the other shares of the 
residue .... " (Emphasis added.) It was the second "then" in the 
phrase "to those then entitled" that might have been construed to make 
evident a desire to postpone vesting until the time of distribution of 
the trust corpus. It was thought, however, that the phrase referred 
to the possibility that a legatee might have died before termination of 
the trust so that his personal representative would take his share of the 
remainder. 
The decision of the Tufts case leads to the substantial inconvenience 
that results whenever distribution must be made to estates of the de-
ceased named residuary legatees. Many of these estates would have to 
be reopened with all the attending delays and incommodities. Because 
of these impractical consequences and the thought that the average 
testator may be more concerned with identifying the objects of his 
bounty at the time of distribution of the property than the technicali-
ties of the law of vesting of nonpossessory property interests, the case 
may be criticized. Such criticism, however, would be based primarily 
on the doubt that the rule preferring early vesting of remainder in-
2 See Barker v. Monks, 315 Mass. 620, 626, 53 N.E.2d 696, 699 (1944); Gilman v. 
Congregational Home Missionary Society, 276 Mass. 580, 584-585, 177 N .E. 621, 
622-623 (1931). 
S See Dunton v. Lyons, 322 Mass. 542, 78 N.E.2d 497 (1948); Sears v. Brown, 241 
Mass. 523, 135 N.E. 874 (1922); compare Harding v. Harding, 174 Mass. 268, 271, 54 
N.E. 549 (1889). 
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terests is wise rather than a denial of the applicability of the rule to the 
case.4 It has been suggested that the preference for early vesting has 
little justification for its existence today.5 
§2.16. Legislation. Chapter 287 of the Acts of 1960 amends the 
Workmen's Compensation Law, G.L., c. 152, §33, to provide that an 
insurer shall pay reasonable burial expenses up to the amount of $1000 
when death results from injuries covered by workmen's compensation. 
Chapter 118 of the Acts of 1960, amending G.L., c. 191, §1O, increases 
from one dollar to five dollars the fee payable to the register of pro-
bate for the deposit and safekeeping of a will. 
Chapter 179 of the Acts of 1960 provides for the validation of acts 
of an executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or trustee per-
formed after the entry of a decree appointing him and before the ex-
piration of the period allowed for appeal therefrom in cases in which 
no appearance against appointment has been entered, or if entered 
has been withdrawn, notwithstanding the fact that an appeal may 
have been taken within the period. 
4 See Old Colony Trust Co v. Clemons, 332 Mass. 535, 540, 126 N.E.2d 193, 196 
(1955). 
5 See 5 American Law of Property §21.3 (Casner ed. 1952); 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §2.13; but compare 3 Restatement of Property §243, Comment i. 
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